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Involuntary
Consent:
Conditioning
Access to
Health Care on
Participation in
Clinical Trials
Ruqaiijah A. Yearby

“Governments exist to protect the rights of
minorities. The loved and the rich need no
protection: they have many friends and few
enemies.”
— Wendell Phillips
“Vulnerability manifests an asymmetrical imbalance between the weak and the powerful and in
this context [bioethics] it demands an ethical
engagement and that the powerful protect the
weak.”
— Jacob Rendtorff

I. Background
Although the controversy over the lack of consent
in fetal-tissue clinical trials is relatively new, history
is replete with instances of medical researchers who
have conducted clinical trials with minorities and the
economically disadvantaged without their consent.1
Traditionally, American bioethics has served as a
safety net for the rich and powerful (for they are not
forced to act as research subjects to obtain access to
health care for themselves or their children) while failing to protect the vulnerable, which includes minorities and the economically disadvantaged. Without
access to health care, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged are unduly influenced to participate in
clinical trials that promise access to health care.
For example, researchers at Johns Hopkins University hospital unduly influenced economically disadvantaged Baltimore parents into enrolling their
children into a research study to prove criminality by
lying about the purpose of the study and promising
them access to free health care otherwise denied by
Hopkins.2 The researchers enrolled more than 7,000
boys, 95% of who came from poor African American
families, into a study to determine whether having an
extra “Y” chromosome increased criminality, but they
told the parents that the study was to test for anemia
and other medical problems. The study did not show
a positive association between the extra “Y” chromosome and criminality or violence in the boys studied,
yet the blood samples linked to names were given to
the police.3 The researchers not only failed to get consent from the parents because they lied about the purpose of the research, but they also unduly influenced
the parents into participating in the study by offering
them access to health care that was usually withheld,
Ruqaiijah A. Yearby, J.D., M.P.H., is the Associate Dean of
Institutional Diversity and Inclusiveness, Professor of Law,
Oliver C. Schroeder Jr. Distinguished Research Scholar, and
Associate Director of the Law-Medicine Center at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.

contemporary challenges in informed consent • fall 2016
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 44 (2016): 445-461. © 2016 The Author(s)
DOI: 10.1177/1073110516667941

445

S Y MPO SIUM

and both actions were a violation of the bioethical
principle of “respect for persons.”
The “respect for persons” principle requires that
“individuals be treated as autonomous agents” by
obtaining their informed consent before they participate in clinical trials.4 In order for the consent to
be valid, it must be free of undue influence, which
includes inducements such as promises of access to
health care. Promises of access to health care invalidate the voluntariness of consent because it leaves
potential research subjects without choice, especially
when the very institutions that are denying minorities
and the economically disadvantaged access to health

accumulation of health care facilities and physicians in
wealthy, Caucasian neighborhoods that do not accept
government health insurance, such as Medicare and
Medicaid,6 and lawsuits for payment by hospitals,
leaving those who are a minority and economically
disadvantaged with little to no access to health care.
Burdened by disease and denied care from health care
institutions, even in emergency situations, minorities
and the economically disadvantaged are induced into
participating in clinical trials to gain access to health
care.
In this paper, I will discuss how race and class biases
are central to the bioethical debate about informed
consent, why these biases prevent
access to health care, and thus, must be
addressed to ensure that research subIn this paper, I will discuss how race and
jects are not being unduly influenced
class biases are central to the bioethical
into participating in clinical trials to
attain access to health care. To measure
debate about informed consent, why these
whether consent is voluntary, federal
biases prevent access to health care, and thus,
agencies such as the U.S. Department
must be addressed to ensure that research
of Health and Human Services (HHS)
should require researchers to use the
subjects are not being unduly influenced into
Vulnerability and Equity Impact Assessparticipating in clinical trials to attain access
ment tool, which I have created based on
to health care.
the Health Equity Impact Assessment
tool, to determine whether minorities
and the economically disadvantaged are
care are conducting the clinical trial. Without any
being unduly influenced into participating in clinical
meaningful choice to access health care other than
trials in violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
participation in clinical trials, minorities and the economically disadvantaged are induced into consenting.
II. Respect for Persons: Voluntary Informed
Thus, according to Professor Patricia King, instead
Consent Required
of serving as a means of protection, bioethical princiCreated with the drafting of the Belmont Report in
ples, such as “respect for persons,” are used to promote
1979, current American bioethical principles are sup“scientific and medical advances without recognizposed to protect the rights and health of research
ing that these developments occur in a social context
subjects while participating in clinical trials.7 One of
that must be taken into account if the ethical issues
the main bioethical principles in the Belmont Report,
are to be adequately addressed.”5 Specifically, when
the “respect for persons” principle requires research
applying the “respect for persons” principle, researchsubjects to be informed about the potential risks and
ers and regulators often fail to take into consideration
burdens of participating in clinical trials before conthe class and racial biases that prevent minorities and
senting to participation. This principle was created in
the economically disadvantaged from attaining equal
response to abuses of the economically disadvantaged,
access to economic opportunities. Without equal
minorities, children, and prisoners. One of the main
access to these opportunities, minorities and the ecoimpetuses for the creation of protections for the economically disadvantaged are prevented from accessnomically disadvantaged and minorities participating
ing health care because of structural and institutional
in clinical trials was the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.
biases within the health care system.
From 1932 until 1972, researchers enrolled ecoAs a result of structural bias, health care services in
nomically disadvantaged African American men who
the United States are delivered based on ability to pay,
lacked access to health care in a clinical trial to doculeaving those who cannot pay (predominately minoriment the course of syphilis, even though the course of
ties and the economically disadvantaged) without
the disease was already known. In exchange for free
access to health care. Institutional biases result in the
meals, access to health care, and burial insurance, the
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researchers promised the men that they would provide
treatment for their “bad blood,” a nebulous complaint
that could include “anemic blood to muscle aches,
general malaise, disorders such as parasitic infections,
gonorrhea, syphilis, and other venereal disease.”8 The
researchers never informed the men that they were
participating in a clinical trial, and therefore, never
told them about the purpose of the trial. Researchers also intentionally deprived these men of “demonstrably effective treatment in order not to interrupt
the project, long after such treatment became generally available,” causing the unnecessary disability and
death of the men, their wives, and their children. The
trial was not only unnecessary because researchers
already knew the course of the disease and its effects,
but it was also dangerous because researchers withheld
information and treatment, which allowed syphilis to
spread to the men’s wives and children. Thus, there
was nothing gained from the trial other than exploiting the economically disadvantaged and minorities.
To put an end to the exploitation of the economically
disadvantaged and minorities, the Belmont Report
incorporated informed consent into the “respect for
persons” principle. Under this principle, researchers
must respect the wishes of persons who are autonomous and capable of self-deliberation. To respect
their autonomy, researchers must “give weight to the
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices
while refraining from obstructing their wishes unless
they are clearly detrimental to others.”9 This respect
of autonomy is fulfilled when researchers inform all
research subjects about the risk of participation in the
clinical trial and obtain the subjects’ voluntary consent to participate. In order to be voluntary, the decision to participate in the clinical trial must be free of
undue influence. Undue influence “occurs through an
offer of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or
improper reward or other overture in order to obtain
compliance,” and includes “action(s) such as manipulating a persons’ choice by threatening to withdraw
health services to which an individual would otherwise be entitled.”10 According to British philosopher
Onora O’Neil, the main purpose of informed consent is to ensure that a research subject has not been
unduly influenced into participating in clinical trials.11
In 1986, the Belmont Report in its entirety, was
adopted by sixteen federal agencies and departments,
including HHS, and codified in 45 C.F.R Part 46 (the
Common Rule). To fulfill the requirements of the
“respect for persons” principle, the Common Rule
mandates that researchers draft and have all research
subjects sign a consent form, which includes, “A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to

which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is
otherwise entitled.”12 Institutions receiving federal
funding to conduct clinical trials must enter into a
contractual agreement with the federal government,
called an assurance,13 asserting that they will comply with the Common Rule requirements, such as
informed consent. Once an institution’s assurance is
approved and it receives federal funding, the federal
government requires that all research conducted by
the institution regardless of who funds it comply with
45 C.F.R Part 46. Hence, the Common Rule governs
nearly all research studies conducted by or funded by
the federal government, except for studies conducted
in emergency settings.14
The Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP), a federal agency within HHS, is responsible for ensuring that institutions comply with their
assurances and the Common Rule.15 To fulfill this task,
OHRP conducts site visits. These visits can be random or in response to allegations of noncompliance
with the Common Rule.16 When reviewing allegations of noncompliance, OHRP grants the institution
an opportunity to refute the allegations. Once additional information is obtained, OHRP determines
whether the institution has violated the law. OHRP
issues corrective action for instances of noncompliance, which is in “the best interest of human research
subjects, and to the extent possible, the institution, the
research community, and HHS.”17 Corrective action
may include restriction or withdrawal of approval for
an institution’s assurance and suspension or permanent removal from participation in specific projects.18
Information regarding allegations and findings of
noncompliance can be found on OHRP’s website.
OHRP is responsible for reviewing compliance at
the institutional level. Every institution that has an
assurance is responsible for ensuring that individual
clinical trials conducted by those affiliated with the
institution comply with the Common Rule. To accomplish this task, all institutions and federal agencies that
enter into an assurance have an Institutional Review
Board (IRB). Before researchers can conduct clinical
trials using human subjects in the United States or be
funded by the United States government to conduct
clinical trials using human subjects, they must submit
a research protocol to their IRB.19 A complete research
protocol includes a statement of compliance with the
ethical principles, such as the “respect for persons”
principle.20 The IRB reviews all written research protocols in application for clinical trials using human
subjects to ensure that the proposed studies are ethical. If the IRB finds that the research protocol is ethi-
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cal, they can approve the research to be conducted
and/or submitted for funding to the United States
government. The IRB can also require modifications
in the research protocol or disapprove any research
protocol.21
In terms of the “respect for persons” principle, the
IRB is required to ensure that all consent forms for
participation in clinical trials include “a statement that
participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discon-

Notwithstanding the requirements of the Belmont
Report, the Common Rule, and the Guidebook, minorities and the economically disadvantaged continue to
be unduly influenced into participating in clinical trials in violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
Although, the “respect for persons” principle standard
is a significant protection when health care is accessible, it has little direct application when health care
access is scarce and medical resources are very limited. For example, the researchers in the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study clearly failed to obtain informed con-

By offering access to health care to research subjects, the researchers
were inducing them to participate in the clinical trial because that was
the main way African Americans could obtain access to health care.
Hence, the African Americans’ consent was not voluntary. Minorities and
the economically disadvantaged still face significant barriers to accessing
health care because of class and racial biases, even after the passage
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).
tinue participation at any time without penalty or loss
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.”22
Thus, in accordance with the Common Rule, the IRB
is required to ensure that no researcher uses research
subjects who have not voluntarily consented to participation in the clinical trial. If the IRB allows subjects to
participate involuntarily, the institution is in violation
of their assurance and subject to corrective action by
OHRP. Not only does the “respect for persons” principle apply to research conducted in the United States
or funded by the United States government, but it also
governs research used to seek drug approval by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
In addition to the Common Rule, OHRP issued a
non-binding guidance to assist IRBs in fulfilling their
responsibilities in protecting the rights and welfare
of human subjects. Among other things, the Guidebook focuses on the need for protecting vulnerable
populations, such as minorities and the economically
disadvantaged, from undue influence that negates
voluntary consent. Specifically, the Guidebook notes
that researchers need to be aware that consent is not
voluntary when there is real or perceived belief that
participation is necessary to receive continuing care
from health professionals or because the receipt of any
treatment is perceived as preferable to receiving no
treatment.23 Thus, seemingly, the lack of meaningful
choice when it comes to accessing health care makes
consent involuntary.
448

sent by lying to the men about the study. However,
even if the researchers had not lied about the study,
the informed consent would not have been voluntary
during the first 32 years of the study. During this time,
the U.S. government (state and federal) mandated and
funded racially separate and unequal health care facilities, often barring African Americans from accessing health care. By offering access to health care to
research subjects, the researchers were inducing them
to participate in the clinical trial because that was the
main way African Americans could obtain access to
health care. Hence, the African Americans’ consent
was not voluntary. Minorities and the economically
disadvantaged still face significant barriers to accessing health care because of class and racial biases, even
after the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).

III. Social Context: Class and Racial Biases
In the United States, class and racial biases, actions
based on negative pre-judgment against a person or
group based on socioeconomic status or race, persist.
These biases predict differential access to resources
such as income and wealth. Often relegated to impoverished and racially segregated neighborhoods,
minorities and the economically disadvantaged attend
low-quality schools, keeping them unemployed,
underemployed, or in jobs without health insurance.
Without these resources, minorities and the economijournal of law, medicine & ethics
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cally disadvantaged are prevented from accessing
health care.24
Among other categories, income and wealth
inequalities are used to measure class and racial biases.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2014 report,
the top 5% of households receive about 21.8% of the
income, while the bottom 60% received 27.8% of the
income.25 Furthermore, the richest 20% of U.S. families accounted for 88.9% of all wealth in the United
States and the highest earning 20% of U.S. families
earned 61.8% of all income in the United States.26 In
fact, in 2013, the median wealth of U.S. upper income
families was $639,400 compared to $96,500 for
middle-income families, and $9,100 for low-income
families, the widest gap in 30 years.27 When you add
in the race factor, economically disadvantaged minorities are more likely to live in neighborhoods with a
high degree of poverty compared to economically disadvantaged Caucasians.28 By 2008, over half of Hispanics, African Americans, and American Indians and
Alaska Natives were economically disadvantaged or
near economically disadvantaged compared with 27%
of Caucasians and 31% of Asians.29
Minorities have higher poverty rates that Caucasians because racial bias prevents them from obtaining the same employment opportunities as Caucasians, limiting their ability to earn income and build
wealth. Research also shows that in several industries
minorities are paid less than Caucasians doing equal
work. For example, minorities, such as African Americans and Hispanics, are often not hired by most of the
well-known high-tech firms; however, when they are
hired they receive less pay and are passed over for promotions and pay raises. Hispanics make $16,353 less,
Asians make $8,146 less, and African Americans make
$3,656 less than Caucasians working in the high-tech
industry.30 This disparity in earnings affects wealth,
leading to racial gaps.
Following the same households for over 25 years
(1984-2009), researchers found that the total wealth
gap between Caucasian and African American families nearly tripled, increasing from $85,000 in 1984
to $236,500 in 2009, a difference of $152,000.31 The
study also showed that in 2009 the median wealth
of Caucasian families was $113,149 compared with
$5,677 for African American families, a difference of
almost $108,000. Researchers found that approximately 66% of the wealth gap between African Americans and Caucasians was a result of racial bias, which
causes racial inequalities in homeownership, income,
employment, education, and inheritance.
For instance, even when African Americans graduate from college, employment inequalities persist.
Indeed, in 2009, the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed

that the unemployment rate for African American
male college graduates was 8.4 percent compared to
4.4 percent for Caucasian college graduates. 32 This
rate is due in part to racial bias. Studies show that
African Americans seeking employment have a harder
time obtaining employment because non-African
American managers tend to hire more Caucasians.
Also, African Americans with non-Caucasian-sounding names received 50 percent less callbacks than
African Americans with Caucasian sounding names.
Thus, it is not surprising that in 2015 unemployment
rates were 9.5% for African Americans compared to
4.6% for Caucasians.33 Income and wealth inequality
directly affect access to health care by minorities and
the economically disadvantaged because health care is
delivered based on ability to pay.

IV. Barriers to Care in the
Health Care System
Structural bias operates at the societal level, denying
some groups access to the resources of society, while
privileging other groups.34 Institutional bias operates
through organizational structures and establishes
‘separate and independent’ barriers through the neutral denial of access to health care that results from
the normal operations of the institutions in a society.
While seemingly similar, there is a significant difference between structural and institutional bias. Institutional bias focuses on the direct effects of institutional actions on minorities and the economically
disadvantaged, whereas structural bias measures how
non-class and non-race based factors, such as the
delivery of health care, indirectly effects minorities
and the economically disadvantaged.
a. Structural Bias
Structural bias is a result of power relationships
between racial and socioeconomic groups, where one
dominant group holds power over the other group
and uses that power to secure material and social
resources, such as income and wealth. The dominant
group remains in power because its position in society enables it to retain power despite the will or aims
of the groups it has power over. In health care, an
example of structural bias is the delivery of health care
based on ability to pay.
As a result of this bias, those with privilege, such
as wealthy Caucasians, obtain the best quality health
care available. The privileged obtain access because
they are able to afford health insurance or pay for
health care not covered by insurance. Those without
privilege, such as minorities and the economically disadvantaged, have limited access to health care because
they do not have health insurance or they cannot afford
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to pay for health care.35 For instance, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely than Caucasians
to work in low-wage jobs that do not offer employersponsored health insurance. Consequently, minorities are more likely than Caucasians to be uninsured
or underinsured, which has not changed significantly
with the passage of the ACA.
In the first open enrollment period of the ACA (20132014), the percentage rates of uninsured fell significantly
for economically disadvantaged adults (from 35% to
24%) and Hispanics (from 36% to 23%).36 Yet, in 2014,
33 million people (10.4%) were still without health
insurance. In 2014, employment-based health insurance
covered 55.4% of the U.S. population, Medicaid covered
19.5% of the U.S. population, Medicare covered 16% of
the U.S. population, direct-purchase health care covered 14.6% of the U.S. population, and military health
care covered 4.5% of the U.S. population.37 Nevertheless, minorities and the economically disadvantaged
still remain uninsured at a higher rate than those who
are privileged because of the failure of those in power in
nineteen states to expand Medicaid coverage.
As of January 2016, Washington, D.C., and 31 states
have expanded Medicaid to cover economically disadvantaged adults. However, in the 19 states that did
not expand Medicaid, the economically disadvantaged remain without health insurance because their
employer does not provide coverage, they earn too
much to qualify for Medicaid, and they do not earn
enough to qualify for tax credits to purchase health
insurance on their own.38 Approximately three million
economically disadvantaged adults remain uninsured
because of the failure to expand Medicaid, and they
reside in states with the largest uninsured population
such as Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina.
These adults work in part-time jobs, jobs for employers with less than 50 employees (so not covered by
the ACA penalties), or jobs that do not provide health
insurance like those in the agriculture and service
industries. Because minorities are more likely than
Caucasians to work in these jobs and live in families
with low incomes, they disproportionately remain
uninsured due to the failure to expand Medicaid. In
fact, minorities make up over half of the uninsured,
while only accounting for forty percent of the U.S.
population.39
Even if minorities and the economically disadvantaged obtain health insurance, they still lack access to
health care because they are underinsured, meaning
they have to pay high deductibles or out of pocket for
medical costs, which they cannot afford. According to
a Commonwealth Fund report, in 2014 over 31 million people were underinsured, about 23% of those
had year-round health insurance.40 Of the underin450

sured, 44% reported forgoing care because of the cost,
and 51% reported having problems paying medical
bills or debts, totaling $4,000 or more. People with
low incomes under 200 percent of the federal poverty line, accounted for 61% of underinsured adults
in the United States. By 2015, the U.S. Census Bureau
reported that 46.7 million people (14.8%) were in
poverty in the United States. The poverty rate has
increased from 2007-2011, when the U.S. Census
Bureau reported that 42.7 million people (14.3%) had
incomes below the poverty line.41 The rate of poverty
for African Americans was 25.8%, 23.2% for Hispanics, and 11.6% for Caucasians.42
Living in poverty, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged, who do not generally have health insurance or are underinsured, are charged more for the
health care services they receive and are increasingly
required to pay upfront for the care they receive. However, the wealthy, who usually have health insurance,
receive discounts on the cost of health care, negotiated
by their insurers. Under the ACA, non-profit hospitals
can no longer charge uninsured patients more than
they generally bill insured patients for emergency and
other medically necessary care.43 Unfortunately, this
still leaves the uninsured (predominately minorities
and the economically disadvantaged) unprotected
because the policy does not apply to for-profit hospitals, which account for up to 40% of all hospitals in
the United States.
Additionally, the ACA does not equalize the care
provided minorities or the economically disadvantaged when compared to the wealthy. A 2012 New
York Times article noted that affluent patients, who
pay in cash, can stay in elite hospital wings that offer
marble baths, butler service, and bed linens by “Frette,
Italian purveyors of high-thread-count sheets [sold]
to popes and princes.”44 Yet, the article noted that
one patient who could not afford the elite rooms was
left in pain, on a gurney, without a bedpan. Nothing
in the ACA mandates equal quality care be provided
to those receiving health care services from the same
health care provider. Institutional bias also prevents
access to health care for the economically disadvantaged and minorities, because health care institutions
are allowed to decide what hospitals to close and who
qualifies for charity care.
b. Institutional Bias
Examples of institutional bias within the health care
system include hospital closures in minority neighborhoods and lawsuits against the economically disadvantaged for unpaid care; both further limit access
to health care. Not all actions by an institution that
disproportionately affect minorities and the economijournal of law, medicine & ethics
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cally disadvantaged are biased. In order to constitute
institutional bias, the action must reinforce the racial
and/or class hierarchy and impose substantial harm
on minorities and the economically disadvantaged.
Once this occurs, then the institution’s actions constitute institutional bias even if the actions are seemingly
neutral.
Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, hospitals in African American communities
closed and relocated to affluent Caucasian neighborhoods.45 In 1992, a report of 190 urban community
hospitals between 1980 and 1987 found that the percentage of African American residents in the neighborhood was the most significant factor in hospital
closures.46 In 2006, Alan Sager reported that as the
African American population in a neighborhood
increased, the closure and relocation of hospital services increased for every period between 1980 to 2003,
except between 1990 and 1997.47 Hence, research
shows that as the percentage of African American residents increased in the neighborhood, hospital closures
increased.
In fact, Dr. Sager has shown that 45% of hospitals
open in 1970 had closed by 2010, and of these hospitals 60% were in neighborhoods that were predominately African American.48 St. Louis and Detroit are
poignant examples of hospital closures linked to race.
St. Louis had 18 hospitals in predominately African
American neighborhoods. By 2010, all but one had
closed. In 1960, Detroit had 42 hospitals open in
predominately African American neighborhoods; by
2010 only four were open. This reduction of hospital
beds in African American communities, which generally have the greatest need for care, further compromises African Americans’ health by decreasing their
access to health care.49
As hospitals leave predominately African American
neighborhoods, the remaining hospitals are left to
fill the void. This often strains the remaining hospitals’ resources and their ability to provide quality care.
Consequently, the hospitals that do remain to provide
care to African Americans gradually deteriorate and
provide substandard care. Not only is access to health
care diminished because of a reduction of hospital
services, but care also suffers because of physician
departures. Once a hospital has closed or relocated,
the physicians practicing in the area often follow the
hospital to more affluent neighborhoods, thereby further disrupting access to health care services in predominately African American neighborhoods. Evidence shows that primary care physicians often leave
after the closure of a neighborhood hospital because
the hospital provides a critical base for their practice.
This disruption in care is significant because many

predominately African American neighborhoods
already suffer from physician shortages prior to hospital closures and physician flight.50 As the number of
primary care physicians decreases, African Americans
are forced to seek care in emergency rooms and public
hospitals, which are often understaffed and not adequately maintained. Thus, the institutional decision
to close hospitals in predominately African American
neighborhoods substantially harms African Americans and reinforces the racial hierarchy that African
American lives do not matter.
In addition to the lack of health care services available in minority neighborhoods, some non-profit hospitals erect barriers to care for the economically disadvantaged by suing them for unpaid medical bills.
These practices have continued even after the passage
of the ACA, which tried to limit these aggressive collection practices. Numerous nonprofit hospitals in Ohio,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, and
Texas, have sued patients for unpaid bills even though
many of the patients are economically disadvantaged
and could qualify for charity care, which would discharge their bills.
For example, in North Carolina, non-profit hospitals have filed more than 40,000 collection lawsuits
in a five-year period. Carolina HealthCare system, a
health care system that manages two non-profit hospitals Moses Cone Health System and Wilkes Regional
Center, has filed over 12,000 lawsuits in a five-year
period, while having over $150 million in annual profits and enjoying $100 million in tax breaks.51 Many of
the patients who were sued for unpaid bills were uninsured and economically disadvantaged. Once the hospital wins the case and receives a judgment against the
patient, it usually places a lien on the patient’s house.
Due to the lawsuits, the economically disadvantaged
patients cannot sell their homes, are pushed further
below the poverty line, have their credit report scores
decline, and forgo medical care because they are worried about future liens being placed on their homes.
This substantially harms them and reinforces the class
hierarchy that the lives of the economically disadvantaged do not matter.
Due to class and racial biases in the U.S. and structural and institutional bias within the health care system, minorities and the economically disadvantaged
are denied access to health care because they are uninsured, underinsured, or unable to pay for health care.
As a result of forgoing health care, minorities and the
economically disadvantaged are often more likely to
be disabled or in poor health and vulnerable to inducements to participate in clinical trials to obtain access
to health care.
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V. The Effect of Bias: Burdened with Disease
Due to the lack of access to health care, minorities and
the economically disadvantaged have higher rates of
disease and disability. Burdened with greater rates of
disease and disability, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged are a panacea for researchers investi-

in the form of redlining policies that prevent racial
integration has resulted in racial segregation of neighborhoods.56 The racially segregated neighborhoods
that are predominately African American usually have
less economic investment, but they have more stressors such as pollution, noise, overcrowded housing

Due to the lack of access to health care, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged have higher rates of disease and disability. Burdened with
greater rates of disease and disability, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged are a panacea for researchers investigating medical
advancements and trying to obtain generalizable scientific knowledge.
Without meaningful access to health care, minorities and the economically
disadvantaged are induced into participating in clinical trials that may
provide a benefit to society, but will not alleviate their increased rates of
disease or disability due to bias.
gating medical advancements and trying to obtain
generalizable scientific knowledge. Without meaningful access to health care, minorities and the economically disadvantaged are induced into participating in
clinical trials that may provide a benefit to society, but
will not alleviate their increased rates of disease or disability due to bias.
For instance, racial bias results in increased stress
for African Americans that impairs their health status.
Studies have shown that both U.S. born and foreign
born African American women, who have experienced
racial bias, were more likely to have hypertension
or hypertension events.52 In fact, African American
women who had experienced racial bias and had chosen not to object to it were 4.4 times more likely to
have hypertension than those who stated that they
took action or talked to somebody. Moreover, research
suggests that there is a higher positive correlation
between perceived racial prejudice and increased
cigarette and alcohol use among African Americans
as compared to Caucasians.53 The increased stress
from perceived racial bias also affects birth outcomes
by increasing African Americans’ rates of infant mortality.54 Finally, research has shown that experiencing
racial bias accelerates the biological aging of African
American men, which may lead to their lower life
expectancy.55
In addition to the direct biological effects of racial
bias that cause increased rates of disease and disability,
racial bias also indirectly increases African Americans’
rates of disease and disability. For example, racial bias
452

stock, and high rates of crime.57 These neighborhoods
also have fewer resources such as places to exercise
or play, which increases African Americans’ rates of
disease and disability. For instance, researchers have
found that the presence of one or more health clubs as
well as lower crime rates were both directly associated
with lower cardiovascular disease risk for the African
American women in their study.58
Furthermore, in racially segregated neighborhoods,
“residents do not have access to healthy food due to a
lack of supermarkets and a preponderance of convenience stores and fast food restaurants as the primary
food outlets,” all of which have been shown to lead to
obesity, a risk factor for cancer and cardiovascular disease.59 Racial segregation also affects the place that
African Americans receive care. In racially segregated
neighborhoods, African Americans are more likely to
undergo surgery in low-quality hospitals, whereas in
areas with low degrees of racial segregation, African
Americans and Caucasians are likely to undergo surgery at low quality hospitals at the same rate. This is
significant because among Medicare patients, most of
the racial disparities in risk-adjusted death rates for
major surgery are a result of the site of care.60
The economically disadvantaged also experience
disparities in health status because of bias related to
poverty and their lack of health insurance. In fact,
“[e]leven percent of the uninsured are in fair or poor
health, compared to [five percent] of those [covered
by private health insurance].”61 Studies also show that
uninsured women with breast cancer are diagnosed
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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later during its development, when treatment is less
effective.62 Increasing the likelihood of serious harm,
uninsured men with hypertension are more likely to go
without screenings and prescribed medication and to
skip recommended doctor visits. Data from the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM Report) 2002 report, Caring
Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late, showed that,
on average the uninsured only received about half the
care that privately insured patients received, and the
uninsured tended to wait longer and get sicker before
seeing a doctor.63
Moreover, the uninsured are less likely to receive
recommended preventive and primary care services,
face significant barriers to care, and ultimately face
worse health outcomes.64 Compared to the insured,
a larger share of the uninsured are unable to pay
medical bills. In addition, the uninsured report problems procuring dental care, filling a prescription due
to cost, and accessing physician care.65 Being economically disadvantaged and uninsured is worse for
minorities. For example, between 2005 and 2006,
“[t]he largest difference in doctor visits between
insured and uninsured populations was seen among
African-Americans and individuals of two or more
races.”66 This racial difference in physician visits is not
new; in 1986, for example, a national survey of the use
of health care services found that “[e]ven after taking
into account persons’ income, health status, age, sex,
and whether they had one or more chronic or serious illnesses, blacks have a statistically significantly
lower mean number of annual ambulatory [walk-in]
visits and are less likely to have seen a physician in a
year.”67 Left without access to health care and overburdened with disease and disability, minorities and the
economically disadvantaged are vulnerable to undue
influence to participate in clinical trials offering access
to health care.

VI. Undue Influence in Clinical Trials
Professor Patricia King, one of the drafters of the
Belmont Report, noted, “[d]espite common recognition that ‘the Tuskegee Study is America’s metaphor
for (racial) discrimination in medical research,’ there
has been inadequate attention paid to race, either in
the sense of negative and differential treatment or in
terms of pervasive scientific (racial) discrimination, in
the construction of bioethics in the United States.”68
Specifically, neither researchers nor those who regulate clinical trials take into account racial and class
biases that make the consent of minorities and the
economically disadvantaged involuntary because of
undue influence. Illustrative of this problem is the
behavior of researchers in selecting research subjects.

Researchers from health care institutions that deny
minorities and the economically disadvantaged access
to health care, use these same populations as subjects
for clinical trials. The promise of access to health previously denied, unduly influences minorities and the
economically disadvantaged to participate in clinical
trials. Below are two examples of instances in which
minorities and the economically disadvantaged were
unduly influenced to participate in clinical trials in
violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
a. Lawsuits, Patient Dumping, and Clinical Trials
Researchers who conduct clinical trials using minorities and the economically disadvantaged are often
affiliated with health care institutions that prevent
access to health care for minorities and the economically disadvantaged. Access to care is limited by lawsuits and denials of nonemergency and/or emergency
care. If participation in clinical trials is the only way
minorities and the economically disadvantaged can
gain access to health care, they are not making voluntary decisions to participate in clinical trials because
they have no other choice in order to gain access to
health care.
For example, Heartland Regional Medical Center, a nonprofit hospital in Missouri that receives
tax breaks in exchange for providing care to the economically disadvantaged, has sued approximately
6,000 patients for unpaid bills from 2009-2013, even
though some of the patients should have qualified to
have their bills forgiven.69 Once the hospital wins the
case and receives a judgment against the patient, it
usually adds 9% interest to the bill and garnishes the
wages of the patient and the patient’s spouse collecting up to 35% of their wages. The hospital has also
taken liens out on a patient’s home to recoup the costs
of any judgment exceeding $1,000. In 2013, the hospital made $605 million in gross revenues, $45 million
of which was profit, yet it filed over 2,200 lawsuits for
medical debts. Garnishments amount to 0.5% of the
hospitals revenues. As a result of these institutionally
biased practices, many economically disadvantaged
patients cannot sell their homes, are pushed further
below the poverty line, have their credit report scores
decline, and forgo medical care because they are worried about future wage garnishments and liens being
placed on their homes. Notwithstanding the lawsuits
filed to collect unpaid hospital bills from the uninsured
and economically disadvantaged, Heartland Regional
Medical Center recruits some of these patients to participate in the clinical trials, which offer access to free
health care as an incentive.
In addition to the financial barriers to care, many
hospitals limit the treatment of economically disad-
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vantaged patients, often redirecting them to community hospitals or clinics, while using them as research
subjects in clinical trials. The University of Chicago
Medical Center (Center) is a perfect example of this
tension between limiting care to minorities and
the economically disadvantaged, while focusing on
expanding clinical trials using these populations. In
2009, the Center adopted policies to redirect people,
suffering from non-urgent injuries and illnesses, who
lived in the neighborhoods surrounding the hospital
to community hospitals and clinics.70 Because the hospital is located in an impoverished area that is racially
segregated, the people being redirected were disproportionately economically disadvantaged minorities.
However, when the Center needed subjects for clinical
trials, these people were solicited for participation in
the trials because of their proximity to the hospital.71
Denials of access to health care occur even when
care is required. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), hospitals are
required to provide a screening examination to determine if a person is experiencing an emergency condition or in active labor.72 If the patient is experiencing
an emergency condition or in active labor, the hospital,
regardless of the patient’s ability to pay, is required to
stabilize the patient, admit the patient, or complete an
appropriate transfer to another facility. Unfortunately,
some hospitals violate EMTALA by denying care to
patients based on ability to pay, but then seek to use
these same patients in clinical trials. For instance, in
2009, the Center tried to limit the number of inpatient beds available to emergency room patients and
failed to provide care to those with urgent care injuries. Although the policies were not fully implemented
after two physician groups voiced their concerns, the
hospital still failed to provide care to patients with
urgent care injuries and was fined $50,000 as a result
of the death of a patient waiting in the emergency
room.73 As discussed above, the Center still uses these
people in clinical trials.
In the United States there is no mandate to treat.
Hence, the lawsuits for unpaid care, redirecting of
patients, and outright denials of care by health care
institutions prevent minorities and the economically disadvantaged from accessing health care. Thus,
when researchers from these same institutions offer
access to health care to minorities and the economically disadvantaged if they participate in clinical trials,
the researchers are unduly influencing these populations to participate in clinical trials because they have
no other choice in order to access health care. This
inducement to participate in clinical trials is a violation of the “respect for persons” principle.
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b. HIV/AIDS Drug Clinical Trials
For 13 years (1988-2001), Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Colorado, and Texas
enrolled foster children aged 3 months to late teens
in Phase I and II drug trials for the treatment of the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus and the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).74 Funded
in part by the National Institutes of Health, the trials were conducted to determine the drug toxicity
and adverse side effects of potential HIV/AIDS drugs.
There were a plethora of problems with the studies,
including the failure to obtain consent for every child
that participated, a violation of the “respect for persons” principle.75 Even though children cannot give
informed consent, the “respect for persons” principle
requires that a parent or guardian consent to the
child’s participation in clinical trials, except in emergency settings.76
The majority of the children used for the study were
African American or Hispanic, economically disadvantaged, and foster children that were wards of the
state or without a guardian. The enrollment of children in the HIV/AIDS drug trials was particularly
objectionable because not only did the researchers
fail to obtain voluntary consent, but also the children
used in the HIV/AIDS drug studies were not even
tested for HIV/AIDS. Thus, the states and researchers
exposed healthy children “to risks of medical research
and drugs that were known to have serious side effects
in adults and for which the safety for children was
unknown.”77
For example, during an Illinois study of dapsone, a
drug to prevent AIDS-related pneumonia, “researchers reported some children had to be taken off the drug
because of ‘serious toxicity,’ others developed rashes,
and the rates of death and blood toxicity were significantly higher in children who took the medicine daily,
rather than weekly.” The researchers noted that for the
period of the study “at least 10 children died from a
variety of causes, including four from blood poisoning,
and researchers said they were unable to determine a
safe, useful dose. They said the deaths didn’t appear
to be ‘directly attributable’ to dapsone but nonetheless
were ‘disturbing.’” Nevertheless, this study and others continued even after 1990 when Azidothymidine,
better known as AZT, was shown to be an effective
treatment for HIV/AIDS without severe side effects.
In addition to this use of minority and economically
disadvantaged children in hazardous drug trials, some
researchers failed to obtain proper consent from participants in the trials.
There were two common practices that violated the
informed consent laws. First, many of the researchers
failed to obtain consent from an authorized person,
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such as an independent advocate, for each child. For
example, none of the 200 Illinois foster children participating in the trials were appointed independent
advocates even though researchers signed a document guaranteeing “the appointment of an advocate
for each individual ward participating in the respective medical research.” In New York, advocates were
only appointed to one-third of the 465 foster children
participating in the trials, and in some instances children between five and ten years of age were asked to
sign consent forms once they were told of the risks and
benefits of the trials. Second, if consent was obtained
from an authorized person it was based on incorrect information. Researchers obtained blanket consent for participating foster children from state welfare agencies based on the premise that the research
had minimal risks and the children would directly
benefit from the research. In fact, government officials in Illinois and New York gave blanket consent
and exempted themselves from the requirement of
appointing independent advocates to provide consent
because the researchers claimed the trials would have
only minimal risks and the children would directly
benefit. However, this information was clearly incorrect because the drugs being tested were known to
cause serious side effects in adults, so the risk was
more than minimal to the children, and there was no
direct benefit to the children participating in the trials
because they were healthy and more than likely not
infected with HIV/AIDS.
Even though presented with overwhelming evidence of the lack of consent in all these trials, OHRP
only noted a problem with the clinical trials in New
York. Moreover, OHRP did not investigate whether
the consent was voluntary. Although the children were
wards of the state with access to health care, they did
not have access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Thus, it seems as
if the state was unduly influenced into giving consent
for the children’s participation in clinical trials based
on the promises of access to these drugs. However,
the states gave blanket consent for the use of these
children instead of reviewing the files of each child to
see if the child was actually infected with HIV/AIDS.
Hence, OHRP should have noted that the consent was
involuntary and put an end to the research studies
immediately.
However, as Carol Levine notes, “there has been no
resolution of the conflict between American society’s
failure to provide basic health care and HIV/AIDS
prevention programs to poor communities of color—
a matter of social justice—and the potential coerciveness of using research participation as an entry into
the health care system.”79 The use of these children
was a violation of the “respect for persons” principle

because, among other things, the researchers unduly
influenced the states into providing consent for these
children by promising access to health care. To ensure
that subjects are not being unduly influenced into participating in clinical trials, I suggest that researchers
be required to complete a Vulnerability and Equity
Impact Assessment (VEIA) tool, based in part on the
Health Equity Impact Assessment (HEIA) tool.

VII. Solution
The VEIA should be used to assess whether the proposed research subjects are being unduly induced to
participate because they lack access to health care,
which is a violation of the “respect for persons” principle. The VEIA requires researchers to identify the
biases in society, including class and race, and the
biases in the health care system, such as structural and
institutional biases, that prevent minorities and the
economically disadvantaged from obtaining access to
health care, and then determine whether the biases
bar minorities and the economically disadvantaged
from participating in clinical trials. The completed
tool should be posted on clinicaltrials.gov and used
by the IRB to determine if the study has fulfilled the
requirements of the “respect for persons” principle
from the Common Rule.
a. Combatting Bias
Since the 1970s, the Health Impact Assessment (HIA)
has been used as a tool to assess the potential effects
of a policy on the health of a population. Although
the HIA can determine if the policy will have impacts
on different social groups, the process does not provide information concerning whether these differential impacts are a result of unfair and biased policies.
Consequently, the HEIA was created to ensure that
assessments about a policy’s impact would include an
evaluation of fairness and equity as well as root causes
of inequities.
The HEIA identifies the root causes of health inequity, such as wealth, income, knowledge, and power
imbalances. There are five purposes of a HEIA:
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1.	“Help identify potential health impacts (positive or negative) of a plan, policy or program
on vulnerable or disadvantaged groups
within the general population.
2.	Help develop recommendations as to what
adjustments to the initiative might mitigate
negative impacts as well as maximize positive
impacts on the health of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
3.	Embed equity across an organization’s existing and prospective decision-making models,
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so that it becomes a core value and one criterion to be weighed in all decisions.
4	Support equity-based improvement in program/service design: ‘How does this program
need to be adjusted to meet the needs of specific populations?’ ‘Could this program benefit some, but not others?’
5.	Raise awareness about health equity as a catalyst for change throughout the organization,
so planners and managers develop ‘stretch
goals’: How can we include more people in
this program, especially those often missed?
What barriers do we have to look for? Are we
as effective as we could be, especially those
with the greatest and most complex health
needs?”80
When completing a HEIA, the following five steps
must be completed:

1. “Screening:
a.	Determine if the initiative requires a HEIA.
If the initiative has the potential to impact
the health of vulnerable or disadvantaged
groups, HEIA is applicable. It is desirable
that all initiatives be screened.

2. Scoping:
a.	Identify affected populations or groups and
predict key impacts (positive or negative) on
those groups. Consider a wide range of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups to avoid overlooking unexpected or unintended consequences of
an initiative.

3. Impact Assessment:
a.	Use available data/evidence to prospectively
assess the impact on vulnerable or disadvantaged groups in relation to the broader target
population. It is both useful and important to
consider a broader range of evidence including consultation findings and grey literature (including project or program reports,
informal practice guidelines, recommended
or promising practices). These sources of
evidence should be weighed based on their
strength and quality.
b.	Where there is very limited data/evidence
available, note the lack of evidence in the
assessment or, where possible, implement
other strategies to gather evidence. Strategies could include conducting surveys, focus
groups, or consultation with experts or
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members of the affected groups where time
permits.

4. Mitigation Strategy:
a.	Develop evidence-based recommendations
to minimize or eliminate negative impacts
and maximize positive impacts on vulnerable
or disadvantaged groups. These recommendations comprise your mitigation strategy.
Uptake of these recommendations in the roll
out of the initiative will help to ensure that
the initiative contributes to equity and does
not perpetuate or widen existing health disparities. Where possible, recommendations
should be informed by diverse members of
the affected communities.

5. Monitoring and Evaluation:
a.	Determine how the rollout of the initiative
will be monitored to determine its impacts
on vulnerable or disadvantaged groups in
comparison to other subpopulations or the
broader target population. The resulting data
will enhance the overall evidence base for
equity-based interventions and can be fed
back into the planning, policy or program
development process.”81
Once these steps have been completed, the organization must decide whether to implement the policy.
Similar to the steps necessary to complete a HEIA, the
VEIA would require researchers to complete five steps
in order to show whether consent to participation in
clinical trials is voluntary.
b. VEIA: Measuring Voluntariness
To complete the VEIA, researchers would need to
screen the research proposal to identify the purpose
of the research, those affected by the condition being
studied, the potential research subjects, and whether
the research is a priority to the potential research subjects. If the potential research subjects are minorities
and/or the economically disadvantaged, researchers
also need to identify the barriers to accessing health
care for these populations and whether obtaining
access to health care is the central reason the populations would participate in clinical trials. If it is, the
researcher must discuss in their research proposal,
why they feel the need to use these populations and
how they will work to eliminate the barriers to accessing health care for these populations. This review can
be incorporated into the current requirement of showing that the research will add to the generalizable scientific knowledge.
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In order to answer these questions, the researcher
must engage someone from the vulnerable population
the researcher plans to use as research subjects. Once
this introspective review, or screening, has occurred
and is noted in the research proposal, then the
researcher must complete the scoping, impact assessment, and mitigation strategy steps.
To complete the scoping step, the researcher must
answer the following questions:
1	What populations are most affected by the
condition being studied?
2.	Even if minority and economically disadvantaged populations are most affected by
the condition, are there other less vulnerable populations that can be used for the
research?
If minorities and/or the economically disadvantaged
are populations most affected by the condition, then
the researcher must assess whether the impacts on
these populations are negative or positive. To complete
the impact assessment, researchers must use all available data, such as empirical research studies. If there
is limited data available, then the researcher should
collect data by “conducting surveys, focus groups, or
consultation with experts or members of the affected
groups where time permits.”82 The evidence should be
used to answer the following questions:
1. Disparities:
a.	Are there race and/or class disparities in the
number of people who suffer the condition?
b.	Are there race and/or class disparities in
the number of people who survive from the
condition?
c.	What quantitative and qualitative evidence of
disparities exists?
d.	Which racial/ethnic groups are currently
most advantaged and most disadvantaged by
the issues this research seeks to address?
e.	Which socioeconomic groups are currently
most advantaged and most disadvantaged by
the issues this research seeks to address?
f.	Will the research exacerbate these
disparities?83
2. Barriers to access health care:
a.	Are there barriers to accessing health care for
minorities or the economically disadvantaged
who are potential research subjects?
b.	If so, what are the barriers?
c.	What are the root causes of these barriers to
care?

d.	Will the research address these barriers?
e.	Will the research exacerbate these barriers?
3. Adverse Impact:
a.	What adverse impact or unintended consequences could result from this research?
b.	Will the impact or unintended consequences
further limit access to health care?
c.	How could the adverse impact be prevented
or minimized?
d.	Can the research provide a solution to
address barriers to accessing health care?
Using the answers from these questions, the researcher
must provide an evidence-based determination of
whether members of a minority group or the economically disadvantaged group should be used as research
subjects because they will not be unduly influenced.
If the researcher decides to use minorities and/or the
economically disadvantaged as research subjects even
though there is a possibility for undue influence, the
researcher must develop a mitigation strategy that will
minimize or eliminate continued barriers to accessing
health care for these populations. If there is a mitigation strategy, the researcher must monitor the actual
strategy to determine whether minorities and/or the
economically disadvantaged actually gain access to
health care outside of participating in clinical trials.
Using the Common Rule, the IRB must review the
VEIA for all proposed clinical trials using minorities
and/or the economically disadvantaged in the United
States to ensure the studies comply with the “respect
for persons” principle. Specifically, the IRB would be
responsible for reviewing the VEIA for each research
proposal to make sure that the study was obtaining
voluntary consent from minorities and/or the economically disadvantaged participating in clinical trials. This review must occur before the researcher submits the proposal for funding and drug approval.
Additionally, new penalties need to be imposed if a
researcher and/or the institution violates the “respect
for persons” principle. Currently, OHRP just issues letters and suspends researchers from federally funded
research. Violations of these requirements should also
result in fines, loss of federal funding, and denial of drug
approval. Researchers that violate the requirements
should also face criminal fines.84 Furthermore, victims
of research conducted in violation of the “respect for
persons” principle should be granted a private right of
action against the institution and the researcher.
If researchers had been required to apply the VEIA,
many clinical trials found to violate the “respect for person” principle would never have been funded. For example, if the researchers who conducted the HIV/AIDS
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drug studies discussed in section VI had been required
to complete the VEIA, it would have shown that the consent was not voluntary. First, the researchers would have
been required to screen the research to identify the purpose of the research, those affected by the condition being
studied, the potential research subjects, and whether the
research was a priority to the potential research subjects.
Because the potential research subjects were minorities
and the economically disadvantaged, researchers needed
to identify the barriers to accessing health care for these

care to the children beyond the study would not have
minimized this potential harm, and thus, there was no
mitigation strategy that would make consent voluntary.

VIII. Conclusion
Due to class and racial biases in the U.S. and structural and institutional biases within the U.S. health
care system, minorities and the economically disadvantaged are denied access to health care because
they are uninsured, underinsured, or unable to pay for

The time has come to put an end to participation in clinical trials without consent,
in areas not exempted by the federal government, by requiring researchers
to eradicate barriers to accessing health care if they use minorities and the
economically disadvantaged for clinical trials. This will only happen if there is a
way to identify and measure undue influence. Thus, the adoption of the VEIA
tool to measure undue influence will ensure that minorities and the economically
disadvantaged are not prevented from reaching their full health potential because
of barriers to accessing health care that are only removed when they are needed
for clinical trials. Without the tool, minorities and the economically disadvantaged
will continue to be sacrificed for the needs of the powerful and the wealthy.
populations and whether obtaining access to health care
was the central reason the populations would participate
in clinical trials. The screening stage would have shown
that the potential to receive access to health care and
HIV/AIDS drugs unduly influenced state child welfare
agencies to grant consent for these children to participate in clinical trials.
At the time of the studies, participation in clinical
trials was the only way to obtain HIV/AIDS drugs, so
the research would have been a priority to the children if they were suffering from HIV/AIDS. However,
because the children were healthy, there was no priority to participate in the clinical trial to obtain access to
the medicine. Furthermore, there was no evidence that
this research was a priority to healthy children in foster
care. If the researchers were able to show that it was a
health priority, the research would still be prohibited
under the scoping step because there was no evidence
during the time the clinical trials were being conducted
that minority and economically disadvantaged children
were the group most affected by HIV/AIDS. Therefore, other populations should have been used. Moreover, the impact assessment would have shown that the
research was too dangerous to conduct on this population because the drugs had severe side effects even for
otherwise healthy children. Extending access to health
458

health care. These barriers to access are compounded
by health care institutions that deny care to minorities
and the economically disadvantaged, and then use this
lack of access to health care as a means to influence
these populations to participate in clinical trials. Until
these biases are addressed minorities and the economically disadvantaged will not have access to health care
and will continue to be unduly influenced into participating in clinical trials in violation of the “respect for
persons” principle.
Therefore, the time has come to put an end to participation in clinical trials without consent, in areas
not exempted by the federal government, by requiring
researchers to eradicate barriers to accessing health
care if they use minorities and the economically disadvantaged for clinical trials. This will only happen if
there is a way to identify and measure undue influence. Thus, the adoption of the VEIA tool to measure
undue influence will ensure that minorities and the
economically disadvantaged are not prevented from
reaching their full health potential because of barriers
to accessing health care that are only removed when
they are needed for clinical trials. Without the tool,
minorities and the economically disadvantaged will
continue to be sacrificed for the needs of the powerful
and the wealthy.
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